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This paper studies asymmetric rst-price menu auctions in the pro-
curement environment where the buyer does not commit to a decision rule
and asymmetric sellers have interdependent costs and statistically aliated
signals. Sellers compete in bidding a menu of contracts, where a contract
species a vector of characteristics and a payment required from the buyer
for delivering these characteristics. The buyer does not commit ex-ante to
a decision rule but rather upon observing all the menus oered by sellers
chooses the best contract. This paper establishes the existence of a contin-
uum of separating monotone equilibria in this game bounded above by the
jointly ex-post ecient outcome and below by the jointly interim ecient
outcome. It shows that the jointly ex-post ecient equilibrium outcome is
the only ex-post renegotiation proof outcome and it is also ex-ante robust
to all continuation equilibria.
1 Introduction
Procurement of goods or services is an important part of the economy. For
example, public procurement by governments accounts for 10 to 15% of GDP
in developed countries and up to 20% of GPD in developing countries. The
items acquired through procurement vary from simple stationary items to highly
complex goods and services such as infrastructure projects, nuclear power plants,
and military weapons. In order to model procurement, various scoring auctions
where a buyer (e.g., government) can commit to a scoring rule are proposed in the
literature. In scoring auctions, each seller submits a single bid (or equivalently
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1a single contract), i.e., a vector of characteristics of the good and a payment
required from the buyer for delivering these characteristics.1 The scoring rule
calculates each seller's score given his bid and the seller with highest score wins
procurement.2 Examples of scoring auctions include the rst scoring auction, the
second scoring auction, and the handicap auction.3
While scoring auctions generate competitive bidding in an intuitive way, scor-
ing rules must specify scores for all possible bids that sellers may submit. This
may be quite complex, especially when characteristics of the good are highly
multidimensional. For example, when a government is considering awarding a
contract for the construction of a tunnel in a mountainous area, the specication
of the tunnel to be built would be highly multidimensional. The characteristics
may include the possible route, length, and radius of the tunnel, the construc-
tion method to be utilized, the air ventilation system, the construction time,
and the operating issues after the construction: the list of the specications goes
on and on. In this case, it may not be economically viable for the government
to commit itself to a scoring rule that species a score for every possible bid.
The diculty of procurement of tunnel construction is compounded because the
construction cost may not be fully known to the construction companies. The
construction cost will depend on the geological characteristics of the mountain,
the composition and distribution of minerals in the area in which the tunnel is
to be constructed. Dierent construction companies may receive dierent sig-
nals on construction costs. Those signals have interdependent values in the sense
that each company's estimate of its construction cost depends on all companies'
signals and its estimate would be more precise if other companies' signals were
known to the company.
This paper analyzes procurement in the environment where the buyer does
not commit ex-ante to a decision rule and asymmetric sellers have interdepen-
dent costs and statistically aliated signals. With no ex-ante commitment to a
scoring rule, a buyer (e.g., government) may, in practice, simply advertise open
invitations for the procurement of a highly complex good or service with a few
descriptive objectives. Sellers can then submit and present their proposals, which
often include multiple possible bids, i.e., pairs of characteristics of the good and
payment. It may take the government a few months or years to evaluate the pro-
1Che (1993) and Asker and Cantillon (2008) study scoring auctions in situations where
sellers' signals on production costs have only private values. Branco (1997) considers scoring
auctions with symmetric sellers, independent signals and common values.
2We use feminine pronouns for the buyer and masculine pronouns for sellers.
3Given the scoring rule in each auction, the seller with the highest score wins procurement.
In the rst scoring auction, the winning seller executes the contract he submits. In the second
scoring auction, the winning seller can execute any contract that matches the highest rejected
score. The handicap auction can give dierent additional scores to dierent sellers on top of
scores based on the contracts that they submit.
2posals and start negotiating with the winning seller on the characteristics of the
good to be delivered and the corresponding payment. Abstracting from reality,
this paper formulates the the rst-price menu auction in which each seller bids a
menu of contracts and, upon observing all the menus oered by sellers, the buyer
chooses the best contract.
This type of menu auctions is relevant and interesting for procurement par-
ticularly under interdependent values. Let u(x)   t be the buyer's payo, where
x is a vector of characteristics of the good delivered to him and t is a payment
from him. For the private value case, let t ci(x;si) be the payo for seller i with
signal si on production costs, where ci(x;si) denotes the production cost of x. In
the private value case, the joint ex-post ecient vector of characteristics of the
good, x
i(si) 2 argmaxx u(x) ci(x;si); delivered by seller i depends only on his
signal si. Even without the buyer's commitment for a scoring rule, seller i will
always submit the jointly ex-post ecient contract (x;t) = (x
i(si);u(x
i(si))  ~ u)
when his signal is si and he is willing to give the payo level, ~ u to the buyer.
This is because (x;t) = (x
i(si);u(x
i(si))  ~ u) is the contract that maximizes the
payo for seller i with signal si conditional on winning the procurement given
the payo level, ~ u that she is willing to give to the buyer. Furthermore, it is
weakly dominant for a seller to submit a single jointly ex-post ecient contract
even when he can submit a menu of contracts.
In the interdependent value case, this is not true anymore. For interdependent
values, let t   ci(x;s i;si) be seller i's payo, where s i is a vector of the other
sellers' signals and si is seller i's signal. The jointly ex-post ecient vector of
characteristics x
i(s) 2 argmaxx u(x) ci(x;s) depends on all sellers' signals s =
[s i;si]. If sellers can oer menus of contracts, seller i with signal si can include
every possible jointly ex-post ecient contract (x;t) = (x
i(s i;si);u(x
i(s i;si)) 
~ u) in his menu for every possible s i given the payo level, ~ u that he is willing to
give to the buyer. If each seller makes his menu oer contingent on his signal, then
the buyer will learn about all sellers' signals by observing their menus. Given her
correct perception on all sellers' signals, the buyer can then choose the jointly ex-
post ecient contract (x
i(s i;si);u(x
i(s i;si))   ~ u) at each s i upon accepting
the menu oered by seller i with signal si.
However, when the menu includes multiple contracts that all generates the
same payo for the buyer, the buyer can choose any contract from the menu and
hence the contract that the buyer chooses may not be necessarily jointly ex-post
ecient. A seller's equilibrium menu oer therefore depends on his belief on how
likely the buyer would choose a contract that would maximize the ex-post joint
surplus when it is equally optimal with some of other alternative contracts in the
menu. This paper studies a separating monotone equilibrium in which a seller
reveals his signal by making his equilibrium menu oer contingent on his signal.
Let i denote the probability that the buyer chooses a contract that maximizes
the ex-post joint surplus in a continuation equilibrium when it is optimal in seller
3i's menu. In turn, 1 i denotes the probability that the buyer chooses the same
contract in seller i's menu, regardless of her belief on the other sellers' signals,
which must be jointly interim ecient in a continuation equilibrium. A vector
 = [1;:::;N] 2 [0;1]N then denotes sellers' beliefs on how likely the buyer
chooses a contract that maximizes the ex-post joint surplus across sellers' menus.
This paper establishes a continuum of separating monotone equilibria in which
lower cost sellers leave weakly higher rents to the buyer, for the entire space of
sellers' beliefs [0;1]N. Following Reny's existence result (2011), one could estab-
lish the existence of a separating monotone equilibrium if each seller's interim
payo function were weakly quasisupermodular and weakly single crossing given
the other sellers' non-decreasing strategies. However, a seller's interim payo
functions may fail to be weakly quasisupermodular or weakly single crossing at
irrational bids or rational bids with a positive probability of ties just as Athey's
single crossing condition may fail in rst price auctions with single dimensional
bids (Reny and Zamir 2004).4 This paper extends Reny and Zamir's \individ-
ually rational tieless single crossing condition" (IRT-SCC) and introduces the
\tieless supermodular condition" (TLS-SMC). This paper shows that IRT-SCC
and TLS-SMC ensure both the weakly single crossing condition and the weakly
quasisupermodular condition at individually rational tieless bids, which are su-
cient to establish the existence of a separating monotone equilibrium at any given
 = [1;:::;N]. Subsequently the existence of a separating monotone equilib-
rium is established at any given  = [1;:::;N] by showing that IRT-SCC and
TLS-SMC are satised in our model.
The continuum of separating monotone equilibria is bounded above by the
joint ex-post eciency level and below by the level of joint interim eciency.
Given the continuum of separating monotone equilibria, we examine which equi-
librium is stable under two criteria. First of all, we adopt the notion of jointly
ex-post renegotiation-proof equilibrium in which it is not mutually benecial for
the buyer and the winning seller to renegotiate their contract given a signal vector.
If equilibrium is not jointly ex-post ecient, there is a positive probability that a
mutually benecial renegotiation between the buyer and the winning seller exists.
While there is a continuum of equilibria, the jointly ex-post ecient equilibrium
is the only one that is jointly ex-post renegotiation-proof.
Joint ex-post renegotiation is a notion that can be used to examine whether
the buyer and the winning seller can improve upon the contract after the win-
ning seller is chosen. Sellers may consider deviations from their menu oers
4Reny and Zamir (2004) show that IRT-SCC is sucient to show the existence of a monotone
equilibrium in rst price auctions with single dimensional bids in the general case involving
asymmetric bidders, interdependent values, and aliated signals. The existence of equilibrium
in rst price auctions can also be found in Athey (2001), Bresky (1999), Jackson and Swinkels
(2003), Lebrun (1999), Maskin and Riley (2000). Those works restrict attention to either two
bidders, symmetric bidders, independent signals, and private or common values.
4(i.e., change their menus) even before the buyer chooses a winning seller. Given
the multiplicity of continuation equilibrium that the buyer chooses to follow for
her contract choice, sellers' incentives for deviations depend on the continuation
equilibrium that they believe the buyer would choose upon their deviations. For
example, consider a separating monotone equilibrium based on a continuation
equilibrium in which the buyer always chooses a jointly interim ecient contract
from seller 1's menu upon accepting it, but always chooses a jointly ex-post ef-
cient contract from the other sellers' menus. If seller 1 believed that the buyer
would in fact follow the continuation equilibrium where she always chooses a
jointly ex-post ecient contract from his menu following his deviation, then seller
1 could deviate to a more aggressive menu, which provides a higher payo to the
buyer than his original menu does, in order to win procurement with a higher
probability. Not only does such a deviation show that equilibrium menu oers
(and consequently equilibrium contracts) in some equilibrium are not ex-ante ro-
bust to the possibility that the buyer would follow an alternative continuation
equilibrium, but it also indicates that some equilibrium may not provide stable
predictions on how likely each seller would win procurement, because seller 1's
deviation to a more aggressive menu makes it more likely for seller 1 to win and
less likely for other sellers to win.
In this light, we can examine how ex-ante robust an equilibrium is to (sellers'
beliefs on) the continuation equilibrium. If the separating monotone equilibrium
is based on a continuation equilibrium in which the buyer chooses a jointly ex-
post ecient contract from the winning seller's menu with positive probability,
then it is ex-ante robust to a set of continuation equilibria in which the buyer
chooses a jointly ex-post ecient contract with a lower probability. Therefore, if
the separating monotone equilibrium is based on a continuation equilibrium in
which the buyer chooses a jointly ex-post ecient contract with probability one,
then it is ex-ante robust to all continuation equilibria: no sellers have incentives
to deviate regardless of the continuation equilibrium that they believe the buyer
would choose to follow for her contract choice following their deviations.
Our paper also shows the role of the buyer as an information collector in
the interdependent value case. In practice of the the rst-price menu auction,
each seller may submit a lengthy proposal that includes many dierent aspects
of procurement and many possible potential contracts. Furthermore it may be
a time-consuming process for the buyer (e.g., government) to review and evalu-
ate sellers' proposals. By reviewing and evaluating sellers' proposals, the buyer
develops an accurate idea about their signals on production costs in equilibrium.
Therefore, the buyer can act as an information collector in the rst-price menu
auction. As an information collector, it is practically important for the buyer
to establish a reputation that the acquired information on all sellers' produc-
tion costs would be used when negotiating a contract with the winning seller.
It suggests sensitive roles for regulations (e.g., Federal Acquisition Regulation in
5the U.S.) or oversight agencies (e.g., Oce of the Procurement Ombudsman in
Canada). Even when the government may not commit to mechanisms or scoring
rules, it can establish regulations or oversight agencies for well-dened procedures
of the rst-price menu auction. They are important not only in preventing fa-
voritism or corruption, and ensuring competitive bidding, but also in providing
and maintaining the government's reputation that its additional information on
production costs would be used when negotiating a contract with the winning
seller. This makes potential sellers submit their proposals, expecting the jointly
ex-post ecient equilibrium.
The result also gives us new insight into why multiple open bidding is im-
portant in practice especially under interdependent values. Recently, Canada
announced a $9 billion plan to purchase sixty ve F-35 ghter jets from Lock-
heed Martin. It was heavily criticized because the federal government chose F-35
ghter jets through exclusive bargaining with Lockheed Martin without compet-
itive bidding from other potential sellers. The potential cost of such an exclusive
bargaining goes much deeper. The announced plan includes not only the sim-
ple purchase of the ghter jets but also the modication of the jets, long-term
maintenance, and training that are tailored specic to the needs of Canadian Air
Force. The costs of modication, long-term maintenance, and training may not
be fully known to the buyer or a single seller. As the buyer invites proposals
from many potential sellers and evaluates the proposals, she learns about costs
that are not necessarily known to the winning seller. Subsequently, the buyer can
negotiate with the winning seller with the knowledge acquired from other sellers'
proposals. The federal government of Canada missed such a valuable opportu-
nity by exclusively bargaining with Lockheed Martin. In this light, this paper
can also be viewed as oering a new aspect of competitive bidding under inter-
dependent values, in the sense that as the buyer reviews and evaluates sellers'
proposals, she learns more about production costs and can use this knowledge
during negotiation with the winning seller.
2 Preliminaries
The buyer contracts with one of N sellers on the characteristics of the good
to be provided and on the monetary payment to be given the seller. Let N =
f1;:::;Ng be the set of sellers. Let t 2 R denote an amount of monetary payment
from the buyer to a seller. Let x 2 X denote the characteristics of the good. For
any x; x0 in X, let x_x0 denote the least upper bound (join) of x and x0; and x^x0
denote the greatest lower bound (meet) of x and x0. If X  R
n, then the join of
x and x0 is the component-wise maximum and the meet is the component-wise
minimum. A set X is a lattice if for any x and x0 in X, the joint and meet of x
and x0 exist as elements of X.
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t = u(x1*(s1,s2)) -u1 
 t’ = u(x1*(s1,s2’)) -u1 
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x 
Figure 1: Preferences under interdependent values
Assumption 1. X is a compact metric space and a partially ordered lattice with
a transitive, re
exive and antisymmetric order relation .5
Each seller i receives a private signal si 2 [0;1] on the production costs of the
good. Throughout the paper, the upper case letter Si will denote seller i's signal
as a random variable and the lower case letter si will denote its realization. The
joint density of sellers' signals is denoted by f : [0;1]N ! R+: When the buyer and
seller i agree to execute a contract (x;t) given a vector of signals s = [s1;:::;sN],
seller i's payo function is t   ci(x;s); the buyer's payo function is u(x)   t;
and the remaining sellers receive their reservation payos. If the buyer does not
contract with any seller, the buyer and all sellers receive their reservation payos.
All reservation payos are normalized to zero. Note that the payo of the seller
who contracts with the buyer depends on the other sellers' signals, so signals have
interdependent values.
Let Ri(x;s) = u(x) ci(x;s) be the joint ex-post surplus between seller i and
the buyer when seller i sells the good with characteristics x to the buyer, given a
5An order relation is re
exive if x  x for all x 2 X and antisymmetric if x  x0 and x0  x
implies that x = x0:
7signal vector s. For each s, let
X

i (s)  argmax
x2X
Ri(x;s)
be the set of jointly ex-post ecient characteristics of the good. Let x
i(s) denote
a typical element in X
i (s). The following explains how a seller's preferences
over contracts depend upon the vector of signals. Consider an example with two
sellers and a one dimensional X as in gure 1. Suppose that seller 1 with signal
s1 is willing to give the buyer a payo level u1: In gure 1, the lower curve is the
buyer's indierence curve associated with the utility level u1 and the two curves
above it represent the iso-prot curves for seller 1 with the signal s1; one with
seller 2's signal s2 and the other with seller 2's signal s0
2.
Note that the buyer's payo does not depend on the vector of production
cost signals. While the buyer is indierent between any contracts along her
indierence curve, seller 1's payo depends on both his signal and seller 2's signal.
If seller 1 knew that seller 2's signal was s2, seller 1, with the signal s1; would
prefer the jointly ex-post ecient contract (x
1(s1;s2);u(x
1(s1;s2)) u1) given the
payo level u1 that he is willing to give to the buyer. If he knew that seller 2's
signal was s0





2)) u1): Because the seller's preferences over those
contracts along the buyer's indierence curve depend on the vector of signals,
it may create incentives for a seller to oer a menu of contracts to the buyer
in which multiple jointly ex-post ecient contracts are optimal for the buyer,
making it possible for the buyer to choose the one that is most preferred by the
seller given the buyer's correct perception on the vector of signals in equilibrium.
Let us consider an example with two sellers and one buyer to show the key in-
tuition of how the rst-price menu auction can achieve the jointly ex-post ecient
outcome. In the rst-price menu auction, the buyer advertises an open invita-
tion for potential sellers without committing herself to a scoring rule. Sellers
then simultaneously submit menus of contracts. After reviewing and evaluating
all menus submitted by sellers, the buyer accepts one or none of menus. If she
accepts a menu, she then chooses a contract (x;t) from the menu. Those sellers
whose menus are not accepted receive zero payos.
Example 1 Let x   t be the buyer's payo when she purchases the good with
characteristic x with transfer t: Let t   ci(x;s1;s2) be seller i's prot when he
produces the good with characteristic x and sells it for transfer t: Each seller
i receives either low signal (L) or high signal (H) for production costs. The
following table shows the probabilities for each pair of signals (s1;s2), the ex-post
ecient characteristic of the good and the cost of producing the good with the






3=8 (L;L) 4 2 8 4
1=8 (L;H) 6 3 10 5
1=8 (H;L) 16 11 12 8
3=8 (H;H) 18 12 14 103
4
For simplicity, assume that the unit of monetary transfer is a quarter.



















































Note that each menu includes jointly ex-post ecient contracts and all contracts





in the menu m1(L) is a jointly ex-post ecient contract between seller 1 and the





is a jointly ex-post ecient
contract when seller 1's signal is L but seller 2's is H: Both contracts in m1(L)
generates the payo of 11
4 to the buyer. The menu with jointly ex-post ecient
contracts maximizes the seller's ex-post payo conditional on a payo level that
the seller is willing to give to the buyer if the buyer in fact correctly chooses a
jointly ex-post ecient contract.
For the buyer's payo, she gets the payo of 11
4 by choosing any contract
from m1(L); the payo of 13
4 from m1(H), the payo of 12
4 by choosing any
contract from either m2(L) or m2(H): Because mi(H) 6= mi(L) for each seller i;
the buyer can correctly infer each seller i's signal from his menu oer (i.e., this
is a separating equilibrium). We examine the buyer's continuation equilibrium
behavior. First of all, let us consider which menu the buyer accepts.
 If menus m1(L) and m2(L) are presented, the buyer accepts m2(L) because
it gives her the payo of 12
4 instead of 11
4 .
 If menus m1(L) and m2(H) are presented, the buyer accepts m2(H) because
it gives her the payo of 12
4 instead of 11
4 .
 If menus [m1(H) and m2(L)] or [m1(H) and m2(H)] are presented, the
buyer accepts m1(H) because it gives her the payo of 13
4 instead of 12
4 :
Now consider the buyer's contract choice, upon accepting a menu, that leads
to the correct choice of the jointly ex-post ecient contract.
9 Note that the buyer accepts seller 2's menu, m2(L) or m2(H); only when
seller 1 oers m1(L). The buyer knows both sellers' signals from their menu
oers and therefore, upon accepting m2(L) or m2(H); she subsequently











at (s1;s2) = (L;H) from m2(H):
 The buyer always accepts m1(H) whether seller 2 oers m2(L) or m2(H):






at (s1;s2) = (H;L) from m1(H) when seller 2's menu





at (s1;s2) = (H;H) from m1(H) when seller 2's menu is m2(H).






















; seller 2 can









if his signal is H: However,
the buyer always accepts m1(H) whether seller 2's menu is m2(L) or m2(H) and
therefore the jointly ex-post contracts that the buyer chooses upon accepting
m1(H) are dierent, depending on whether the buyer's perception on seller 2's
signal is L or H: It implies that seller 1 with H must include two dierent ex-
post ecient contract in his menu m1(H) for joint ex-post eciency. This is how
the jointly ex-post ecient equilibrium is achieved through the rst-price menu
auction.
The equilibrium payo for seller 1 with L is zero because his menu m1(L) is





4   12) = 40
16; where 1
4 is the probability of s2 = L conditional on
s1 = H and 3
4 is the probability of s2 = H conditional on s1 = H: The equilibrium







4  0 = 3
4: The equilibrium payo for







4  0 = 8
16:
Consider a seller's deviation to an alternative menu. Because a menu may
include multiple optimal contracts for the buyer, we will have the multiple con-
tinuation equilibria. Assume that the buyer correctly chooses a jointly ex-post
ecient contract only if jointly ex-post ecient contracts are included in the
menu and it is optimal to do so. Because a jointly ex-post ecient contract max-
imizes the seller's ex-post payo conditional on the payo that he is willing to
give to the buyer, we can consider the deviation to only those menus that include
jointly ex-post ecient contracts.
6Even if the buyer does not choose m1(L) in equilibrium, it is needed to prevent seller 2's
potential deviation.
10It is straightforward to show that there is no protable deviation for any
seller. For instance, suppose that seller 2 with L is contemplating to deviate.
If he wants to deviate to raise the buyer's payo from 12
4 to 13
4 ; it would be
best for him to oer the menu with jointly ex-post ecient contracts, m0 =
f(8; 19
4 );(12; 35
4 )g, expecting that the buyer would choose (8; 19
4 ) when seller 1's
signal is L but (12; 35
4 ) when seller 1's signal is H: Because the buyer gets the
payo of 11
4 from the menu of seller 1 with signal L; seller 2's menu m0 will be
accepted for sure if seller 1's signal is L: However, if seller 1's signal is H; then his
menu m1(H) also generates the payo of 13
4 : In this case, the buyer chooses m0 or
















4 so that it is not protable. Similarly,
we can show that it is not protable for seller 2 with signal L to deviate in order
to raise the buyer's payo even higher or to lower it below 11
4 : In the same way,
we can show that no seller has incentives to deviate regardless of his signals and
hence a jointly ex-post ecient contract is executed in equilibrium.
The example above highlights how the jointly ex-post ecient outcome can
be achieved in the rst-price menu auction without the buyer's commitment to a
decision rule or mechanism. However, without it, a menu with multiple optimal
contracts for the buyer also leaves multiple continuation equilibria. Therefore, it
is natural to expect to multiple equilibria, one with each continuation equilibrium.
After establishing the continuum of separating monotone equilibria in the rst-
price menu auction, we will examine how an equilibrium is stable in terms of the
ex-post renegotiation proofness and the ex-ante robustness.
2.1 First-Price Menu Auction
Let us formally formulate the rst-price menu auction. From now on, we will
maintain the following assumptions on the buyer's and sellers' payo functions,
and on the joint density function f of sellers' signals.
Assumption 2 (i) ci(x;s) is bounded, measurable, and continuous in x at each
s.
(ii) u(x) is bounded, measurable and continuous.
(iii) ci(x;s) is strictly decreasing in si and non-increasing in s i at each x.
(iv) For x and x0 in X at each s,
u(x ^ x
0)   ci(x ^ x
0;s) + u(x _ x




0;s) + u(x)   ci(x;s):
(v) For any x0  x; ci(x0;s)   ci(x;s) is non-increasing in s.
Assumption 2.(iv) implies that the joint ex-post surplus function is supermod-
ular in x at each s. Assumption 2.(v) implies that ci(x;s) is single crossing in s,
11and it follows that the ex-post surplus function R(x;s) is also single crossing in
s:
Assumption 3 (i) f(s) is measurable and strictly positive on [0;1]N.
(ii) f(s _ s0)f(s ^ s0)  f(s)f(s0) for all s;s0 2 [0;1]N.
Assumption 3.(i) implies that, given any si; the support of i's conditional
distribution on the other signals is [0;1]. Assumption 2.(ii) implies that signals are
aliated. The aliation property of signals is used in establishing the existence
of monotone equilibria but it is not needed to establish the results on jointly
ex-post proofness and ex-ante robustness in the next section.
Formally, a menu mi that seller i submits is a closed subset of X  R.7 Let
Mi be the set of all feasible menus available to each seller i: By reviewing and
evaluating menu mi; the buyer learns the maximum payo that she can achieve
from accepting mi. For any menu mi, dene





The payo from choosing any contract in D(mi) is the maximum payo that the
buyer can achieve once she accepts mi: Given m = [m1;:::;mN]; let i(m) 2
(mi) be the probability distribution over the contracts in the menu mi that the
buyer choose a contract (x;t) from. The buyer's strategy for contract choices
 = [1;:::;N] is a continuation equilibrium if the support of i(m) is a subset
of D(mi) for all m and all i.8 Let C be the set of all continuation equilibria.






upon the buyer's acceptance of mi.
The buyer's optimal menu acceptance behavior is as follows. She accepts the
menu that gives her the highest payo among all submitted menus if the highest
payo is non-negative. If there are two or more such menus, she accepts either of
7A scoring rule or function s : X  R ! R+ must specify a score for every single contract
in the entire space of X  R and it would be quite dicult for the buyer to commit ex-ante to
such a rule especially when the set of characteristics X is highly complex and large. A menu
is simply an arbitrary subset of X  R so that a seller can include only a few contracts (x;t)
from X  R: It is more tractable for a seller to deal with such a menu than it is for the buyer
to commit ex-ante to a scoring rule that species scores for all contracts in the entire space of
X  R.
8A continuation equilibrium consists of (i) the buyer's contracting decision strategies  =
[1;:::;N] and (ii) her belief on sellers' signals contingent on their menu oers, which is
formed according to Bayes' rule whenever possible. A continuation equilibrium is referred as
only the buyer's contracting decision strategies unless specied because it is straightforward to
assign an admissible belief for a separating monotone equilibrium dened in Denition 1.
12them with equal probability. Let mj : [0;1] ! Mj denote seller j's menu strategy.
Let uj(sj) denote the maximum payo that the buyer can achieve by accepting
mj(sj). That is, uj(sj) is the payo that the buyer can achieve by choosing a
contracting decision in D(mj(sj)): Let ui be the maximum payo that the buyer
can achieve by accepting seller i's menu mi. Let ki(ui;u i(s i)) be the number
of sellers such that
ki(ui;u i(s i)) = #fj : uj(sj) = ui = max
n un(sn)  0g:
Let i(ui;u i(s i)) denote the probability that seller i wins the procurement
when he oers a menu mi that induces a maximum payo ui to the buyer, given
the other sellers' menu oers m i(s i):
i(ui;u i(s i)) =

1=ki(ui;u i(s i)) if ki(ui;u i(s i))  1;
0 otherwise. :
When the other sellers employ menu strategies m i; seller i's interim payo as-
sociated with his signal si and his menu oer mi is
Vi(mi;m ijsi;i) = E[vi(mi;m i(S i);S;i)i(ui;u i(s i))jsi]:
Denition 1 fm;g is a separating monotone (pure-strategy) equilibrium if
1. for all i 2 N; all mi 2 Mi; and a.e. si 2 [0;1], mi satises
Vi(mi(si);m ijsi;i)  Vi(mi;m ijsi;i);
given a continuation equilibrium  2 C.
2. for all i 2 N, mi(si) 6= mi(s0
i) if si 6= s0
i and
3. for all i 2 N; ui(s0
i)  ui(si) if s0
i  si.
Denition 1.1 is self-explanatory in that mi(si) is the best reply for seller i with
signal si given the other sellers' strategies and the continuation equilibrium that
the buyer chooses to follow for her choice of a contract upon accepting a menu.
Denition 1.2 implies that sellers with dierent signals separate themselves by
oering dierent menus so that the buyer can correctly infer each seller's signal
from his menu oer. A menu is suciently general for a seller to reveal his
signal on production costs. For example, even when seller i is willing to give the
same level of payo ui to the buyer under two dierent signals, he can construct
two dierent menus mi and m0
i that can induce the same maximum payo ui:9
9Although mi and m0
i induce the same maximum payo ui for the buyer, the sets of optimal
contracts for the buyer can be dierent (D(mi) 6= D(m0
i)) so that mi 6= m0
i: Alternatively, mi
and m0
i may have the same set of optimal contracts for the buyer (D(mi) = D(m0
i)) but they
can have dierent contracts that yield payos lower than ui so that mi 6= m0
i:
13Denition 1.3 implies the monotonicity of each seller's menu strategy in the sense
that if his signal is higher, a seller oers a menu that yields a higher payo to
the buyer.
The potential diculty in analyzing the equilibrium is the multiplicity of con-
tinuation equilibrium that will arise when a menu leaves multiple optimal con-
tracts available to the buyer. Not only should a seller consider competing sellers'
menu strategies, but he should also form a correct belief over the continuation
equilibrium that the buyer would choose to follow from among the multiple con-
tinuation equilibria. Given the other sellers' non-decreasing strategies, let A(ui)
be the event that the maximum payo that the other sellers' menus can give to









where uj(sj) is the maximum payo that the buyer can achieve by accepting the
menu mj(sj).
If Pr(A(ui))jsi) = 0; then E[(R(x;S)   ui)i(ui;u i(S i))jA(ui);si] = 0 be-
cause i(ui;u i(s i)) = 0 for all s i; given si and ui: When seller i's menu mi
induces a maximum payo ui to the buyer and she chooses the contract (x;t)
with t = u(x)   ui; upon accepting mi, seller i's interim payo is
E[(t   ci(x;S))i(ui;u i(S i))jsi] =
E[(u(x) + ci(x;S)   ui)i(ui;u i(S i))jsi] =
Pr(A(ui))jsi)E[(R(x;S)   ui)i(ui;u i(S i))jA(ui);si]:
Consider the jointly interim ecient and the jointly ex-post ecient char-
acteristics of the good when seller i sells the good to the buyer given the other
sellers' non-decreasing strategies. When ui is the maximum payo that the buyer
can achieve from a menu mi oered by seller i with signal si; and she chooses (x;t)
with t = u(x)   ui from mi, the joint interim surplus conditional on (A(ui);si)
becomes E[Ri(x;S)i(ui;u i(S i))jA(ui);si]: Given (A(ui);si;u i), let
X
e
i (A(ui);si;u i) = argmax
x2X
E[Ri(x;S)i(ui;u i(S i))jA(ui);si] (2)
be the set of jointly interim ecient characteristics of the good.
Because Ri(x;s) is continuous in x at each s and i(ui;u i(s i)) is a real
number in [0;1]; Ri(x;s)i(ui;u i(s i)) is continuous in x at each s: It implies
that E[Ri(x;S)i(ui;u i(S i))jA(ui);si] is continuous in x: Because X is compact
and E[Ri(x;S)i(ui;u i(S i))jA(ui);si] is continuous in x, Xe
i (A(ui);si;u i) is
non-empty by Weierstrass' Theorem. Let xe
i(ui;si;u i) denote a typical element
in Xe
i (A(ui);si;u i): If E[(R(x;S)  ui)i(ui;u i(S i))jA(ui);si] = 0 for all x 2
14X, then let Xe
i (ui;si;u i) = fxg; where x 2 X denotes the status-quo action
such as no trading, that makes Ri(x;s) = vi(x;s) + u(x) = 0 for all s 2 [0;1].
Let x  x for all x 2 X.
Suppose that the buyer will always choose the same contract from a seller's
menu regardless of her perception on all sellers' production cost signals after she
evaluates all menus. In equilibrium, the same contract that the buyer chooses
must be a jointly interim ecient contract because it is always feasible for a
seller to submit a degenerate menu consisting of a single contract. Therefore, the
equilibrium is only jointly interim ecient even though sellers' signals are fully
revealed to the buyer in equilibrium.
Contrarily, suppose that the buyer will always choose a jointly ex-post ecient
contract from a seller's menu when it is available in the menu and optimal to the
buyer. Consider the jointly ex-post ecient contract (x
i(s);u(x
i(s))   ui(si))
associated with the maximum payo ui(si) that seller i is willing to give to the
buyer at each si , where s = (si;s i): Given si and ui(si), seller i may include
every jointly ex-post ecient contract (x
i(s);u(x
i(s))   ui(si)) for every s i:
Because the buyer is fully aware of sellers' production cost signals after evaluating
their menus in a truthful monotone equilibrium, she can choose the jointly ex-
post ecient contract (x
i(s);u(x
i(s)) ui(si)) from seller i's menu at every s as
long as ui(si) is the maximum payo that she can achieve from accepting seller
i's menu. When all sellers believe that the buyer would always choose such a
jointly ex-post ecient contract, they will submit their menus accordingly and
the equilibrium is jointly ex-post ecient.10
When a menu includes multiple optimal contracts for the buyer, it leads to
multiple continuation equilibria. If it was optimal, the buyer could always choose
a jointly ex-post ecient contract from a menu. Alternatively, the buyer may
choose the same optimal contract regardless of her perception on sellers' signals.
In this case, the contract that the buyer chooses must be jointly interim ecient
because a seller can always oer a degenerate menu consisting of a single con-
tract. Finally, the buyer may even randomize her choice between a jointly ex-post
ecient contract and a jointly interim ecient one in a menu.
10As in rst-price auctions with asymmetric bidders, the equilibrium may not be fully ex-
post ecient with asymmetric sellers even when the buyer always chooses a jointly ex-post
ecient contract from the winning seller's menu. This is because the buyer may not accept a
menu oered by a seller with whom she can maximize the joint ex-post surplus. If sellers are
ex-ante homogenous and the (joint) probability distribution on signals is symmetric as assumed
in many applications, then the jointly ex-post ecient equilibrium is fully ex-post ecient.
153 Separating Monotone Equilibria
Because the buyer cannot commit herself to a scoring rule, sellers' menu oers
depend on their beliefs over how likely the buyer will choose a jointly ex-post
ecient contract in a continuation equilibrium when it is one of the optimal con-
tracts for her within a menu. We establish the existence of a separating monotone
equilibrium by taking two steps. As the rst step, this section considers a mod-
ied auction in which (i) each seller i directly submits the buyer's payo bid ui
along with the characteristics xi of the good and (ii) the buyer knows sellers'
signals but each seller knows only his own signal. When the buyer accepts con-
tract (ui;xi) from seller i in this modied auction, she chooses xi and makes the
monetary payment ti = u(xi)   ui with probability 1   i so that (xi;u(xi)   ui)
generates her a payo that exactly matches the payo bid ui that seller i sub-
mits. With probability i; the buyer chooses the jointly ex-post ecient contract
(x
i(s);u(x
i(s))   ui); at each s; that generates the payo bid ui submitted by
seller i. We complete the rst step by showing the existence of a monotone equi-
librium in this modied auction with any arbitrary  = [1;:::;N] 2 [0;1]N:
In the second step, we show that for a monotone equilibrium in this modied
auction with any given ; there exists a payo-equivalent separating monotone
equilibrium in the rst-price menu auction in which the buyer chooses, upon
accepting a menu, a jointly ex-post ecient contract with probability i and
a jointly interim ecient contract with probability 1   i from each seller i's
equilibrium menu. Because there exists a separating monotone equilibrium for
any given  2 [0;1]N; there exists a continuum of separating monotone equilibria
that spans the entire space of [0;1]N:
First consider the modied auction. In the modied auction, each seller i
submits a bid (ui;xi) from Ui  X; where Ui = [0;1) [ fug with u < 0: Let ui
be a payo bid and xi be a bid for the characteristics of the good. When seller
i submits u; he must submit x along with it. Let (u;x) be the losing bid
regardless of the bids submitted by other sellers. If (ui;xi) 6= (u;x); it is called
a serious bid. Assume that each seller knows only his own signal but the buyer
knows every seller's signal. The buyer chooses a seller whose payo bid is the
highest non-negative bid from among all sellers' payo bids. If there are two or
more sellers who submit the highest non-negative payo bid, the buyer chooses
either of them with equal probability. When seller i wins the procurement with
(ui;xi) 2 Ui X, the buyer buys the good with characteristics xi from seller i by
paying ti = u(xi) ui with probability 1 i, but she buys the good with jointly
ex-post ecient characteristics x
i(s) 2 X
i (s) by paying ti = u(x
i(s)) ui for all
s 2 [0;1]N with probability i. We x  = [1;:::;N] as part of the procurement
rule and it is known to sellers.
We now examine the existence of a monotone equilibrium in the modied
auction with any given  = [1;:::;N] 2 [0;1]N: Seller i's strategy is a pair
16consisting of a payo bidding function, ui : [0;1] ! Ui, and a bidding function
for the characteristics of the good, xi : [0;1] ! X. Suppose that the other
sellers' strategies are non-decreasing: i.e., for all j 6= i, uj(s0
j)  uj(sj) and
xj(s0
j)  xj(sj) if s0
j  sj. Seller i's interim payo associated with submitting
(ui;xi) is
Vi(ui;xi;u ijsi) =
(1   i)Pr(A(ui)jsi)E[(Ri(xi;S)   ui)i(ui;u i(S i))jA(ui);si]+
i Pr(A(ui)jsi)E[(Ri(x

i(S);S)   ui)i(ui;u i(S i))jA(ui);si]: (3)
Alternatively, we can express seller i's interim payo as follows. First, dene the
surplus between seller i and the buyer as
R






when seller i wins the procurement with a characteristics bid xi and an arbitrary
payo bid. Because of Assumption 1.(v)-(vi), R




i (xi;s) is non-decreasing in s whenever x0
i  xi. Seller i's interim




i (xi;S)   ui)i(ui;u i(S i))jA(ui);si]: (5)
Theorem 1 below establishes the existence of a monotone equilibrium in the
modied auction with any given  = [1;:::;N] 2 [0;1]N.
Theorem 1 For any given  = [1;:::;N] 2 [0;1]N, the modied auction pos-
sesses a monotone equilibrium f(^ u1;^ x1);:::;(^ uN;^ xN)g.
Theorem 1 is closely related to Reny (2011) because a bid (ui;xi) is multidi-
mensional. Theorem 4.1 in Reny (2011) demonstrates that if certain conditions
(G.1-G.5 in Reny 2011) on players' actions, payo functions, and types are sat-
ised and each player's set of monotone best replies is nonempty and join-closed
whenever the others employ monotone pure strategies, then a Bayesian game
possesses a monotone equilibrium. In our modied auction, let Bi(si) be the set
of best replies for seller i with signal si when the other sellers employ monotone
strategies so that Bi(si) includes every (ui;xi) that maximizes seller i's interim
payo given the other sellers' monotone strategies.
Bi() is monotone if for any monotone strategies of the other sellers (u i;x i),








i). This monotonicity is strictly weaker than the increasing property of best
replies in the strong order set (Milgrom and Shannon 1994). Bi() is join-closed
if (ui;xi) 2 Bi(si), and (u0
i;x0
i) 2 Bi(si) implies that (ui _ u0
i;xi _ x0
i) 2 Bi(si).
17Reny establishes the existence of a monotone equilibrium ingeniously by uti-
lizing a xed-point theorem based on contractibility rather than the convexity
of best replies (Athey 2001, McAdams 2006). Proposition 4.4 in Reny (2011)
provides a convenient sucient condition for the existence of a monotone equi-
librium: If the set of bids for each player is a lattice and each player's interim
payo function is weakly single crossing and weakly quasisupermodular, then
each player' set of monotone best replies is non-empty and join-closed. To see
this point, x the other sellers' monotone strategies. Each seller i's interim payo
function is weakly single crossing if, for all pairs of bids (u0
i;x0
i)  (ui;xi) and all















Each seller i's interim payo function is weakly quasisupermodular if, for all
(ui;xi);(u0
i;x0
i) 2 Ui  X and all si 2 [0;1];














The idea behind these conditions is straightforward. Consider any pair of best




i  si: Because
(ui;xi) 2 Bi(si); we have





By weakly single crossing, the inequality above implies
Vi(ui;xi;u ijs
0




























that Bi() is monotone. By setting up si = s0
i; the join-closedness follows as well.
However, a seller's interim payo function in the modied auction may fail
to be weakly single crossing and/or weakly quasisupermodular at irrational bids
or rational bids with a positive probability of ties, as a seller's interim payo
function in rst price auctions with single dimensional bids (i.e., real numbers)
may fail to satisfy Athey's (2001) single crossing property.11 Reny and Zamir
(2004) avoid this problem and establish the existence of a monotone equilibrium
11See the examples in Reny and Zamir (2004) that show the failure of the single crossing
property.
18in a rst price auction with single dimensional bids by considering limits of ever
ner nite bid sets such that no two sellers have a common serious bid and by
recalling that single crossing is needed only at individually rational bids, i.e.,
\individually rational tieless single-crossing condition" (IRT-SCC).
For the existence of a monotone equilibrium in the modied auction, this
paper proposes the \tieless supermodular condition" (TLS-SMC) and extends
Reny and Zamir's IRT-SCC. TLS-SMC, together with IRT-SCC, ensures both
the weakly single crossing condition and the weakly quasisupermodular condition
at individually rational tieless bids. We formally dene TLS-SMC in Denition
2 below.
Denition 2 The modied auction satises TLS-SMC if, for each seller i, any
(ui;xi); (u0
i;x0
i) with Pr[u < maxj6=i uj(sj) = ui or u0
i] = 0 given any non-
















TLS-SMC implies that for any two tieless serious bids (ui;xi) and (u0
i;x0
i);





























The extension of Reny and Zamir's IRT-SCC is given below.
Denition 3 The modied auction satises IRT-SCC if, for each seller i, all
pairs of (ui;xi) and (ui;xi) such that (i) ui  ui and xi  xi and (ii) Pr[u <
maxj6=i uj(sj) = ui or ui] = 0 given any non-decreasing payo bidding functions
u i for the other sellers, the following condition is satised: If Vi(ui;xi;u ijsi) 
0; then






i  si: If Vi(ui;xi;u ijs0
i)  0 for any s0





i) =) Vi(ui;xi;u ijsi)  Vi(ui;xi;u ijsi):
19TLS-SMC requires that bids be serious and tieless but the individual ratio-
nality of bids (i.e., Vi(ui;xi;u ijsi)  0; Vi(ui;xi;u ijs0
i)  0) is also required
for IRT-SCC. Lemma 1 enables us to apply Theorem 4.1 in Reny (2011) when
proving the existence of a monotone equilibrium.
Lemma 1 The modied auction satises TLS-SMC and IRT-SCC.
We rst consider the nite modied auction in which (i) the set of feasible
bids for each seller i is given by Un
i X; where Un
i is a nite set including u and
satises that for any ui 2 Un
i ; ui 6= 0 implies that ui  0, and (ii) Un
i and Un
j
do not have any common serious payo bids for any i 6= j: Therefore, TLS-SMC
and IRT-SCC are satised in the nite modied auction. As in Reny and Zamir
(2004) and Athey (2001), each seller is restricted to submit the losing bid (u;x)
whenever his signal is in [0;"); where " = 1=n with n being a natural number. In
the nite modied auction, n is xed so that [0;") has positive measure but the
measure of [0;") converges to zero as n ! 1.





N)g be a monotone equilibrium in the modied auc-
tion game Gn; with an arbitrary  = [1;:::;N] 2 [0;1]N, in which seller i's
nite set of payo bids is denoted by Un
i and, hence, the set of payo and char-
acteristics bids is Un







dense in Ui: The proof of Theorem 1 is completed by showing that the limit




N)g is a monotone equilibrium in
the modied auction without restrictions on the sets of payo bids. As in Reny
and Zamir (2004), we carefully show the following two points. First of all, we
show that, given the limit bidding functions ^ u i of the other sellers, seller i's in-
terim payo associated with any bid (ui;xi) can be approximated arbitrarily well
or he can improve upon his payo by slightly increasing his payo bid, given the
same action bid xi, that does not tie the other sellers' payo bids with probability
one. Secondly, we are concerned that the possibility of ties may lead the limiting
payos to dier from the payos at the limit strategies. It is shown that the
probability that, under ^ u, two or more sellers simultaneously submit the highest
payo bid above u is zero so that the limiting payo for seller i with si is always
obtained by employing the limit bids (^ ui(si);^ xi(si)) given the other sellers' limit
bidding functions, ^ u i.
Finally, we establish a continuum of separating monotone equilibria in the
rst-price menu auction.
Theorem 2 For a monotone equilibrium f(^ u1;^ x1);:::;(^ uN;^ xN)g in the modi-
ed auction with any given  = [1;:::;N] 2 [0;1]N; there exists a separating
monotone equilibrium fm
1;:::;m







i) = Vi(^ ui(si);^ xi(si);^ u ijsi)
20for each i and all si.
Theorem 2 demonstrates that for any monotone equilibrium in the modied
auction with any given  = [1;:::;N] 2 [0;1]N; we can nd a payo-equivalent
separating monotone equilibrium in the rst-price menu auction in which each
seller i believes that the buyer, upon accepting his equilibrium menu, would
optimally choose a jointly ex-post ecient contract with probability i and a
jointly interim ecient contract with probability 1   i. Because there exists
a separating monotone equilibrium for any given  2 [0;1]N; there exists the
continuum of separating monotone equilibria that spans [0;1]N; the entire space
of sellers' beliefs on how likely the buyer would choose either a jointly ex-post
ecient contract or a jointly interim ecient contract.
4 Menus and Interdependent Values
Given the continuum of separating monotone equilibria, equilibrium allocation is
bounded below by jointly interim eciency and above by joint ex-post eciency.
In following subsections, we study the stability of the equilibria in two fronts.
First of all, we study which equilibrium gives no incentives for jointly ex-post
renegotiation to the buyer and the winning seller. Secondly, even before the
buyer chooses a winning seller, a seller may consider deviating from his menu
(i.e., change his menu). Prior to the buyer's choice of a winning seller, sellers'
incentives to deviate depend on the continuation equilibrium that they believe
the buyer would follow following their deviations. Some equilibrium may be
supported only through a particular continuation equilibrium because a seller
may want to deviate under any other continuation equilibrium. In this sense,
we study how sensitive an equilibrium is to sellers' beliefs on the continuation
equilibrium or how ex-ante robust it is to sellers' beliefs on the continuation
equilibrium.
We have demonstrated that the degree of eciency in the rst-price menu
auction with menus is dependent on sellers' beliefs on how the buyer will use her
information on production costs when choosing a contract from the menu. Be-
cause the buyer cannot commit herself to scoring rules, there exists a continuum
of separating monotone equilibria. It is important to nd out whether there is
an equilibrium that is more stable than others.
Fix a separating monotone equilibrium fm
1;:::;m
N;g given a vector  =
[1;:::;N]: Let f(^ u1;^ x1);:::;(^ uN; ^ xN)g be its corresponding payo-equivalent
monotone equilibrium in the modied auction. Let seller i be the winning seller




i (^ xi(si);s)   ^ ui(si) = (1   i)Ri(^ xi(si);s) + iRi(x

i(s);s)   ui(si);
21where ^ xi(si) = xe
i(A(^ ui(si));si;^ u i) so that Ri(^ xi(si);s) is the ex-post joint sur-
plus associated with the jointly interim ecient characteristics of the good given




jointly ex-post ecient surplus.
Suppose that the buyer chooses seller i as the winning seller given the sig-
nal vector s = [si;s i] in a separating monotone equilibrium fm
1;:::;m
N;g.
The buyer receives the ex-post payo of ^ ui(si) for certain. However, the win-
ning seller's ex-post payo is Ri(^ xi(si);s)   ^ ui(si) with probability 1   i and
Ri(x
i(s);s)   ^ ui(si) with probability i, so that his expected ex-post payo is
R
i (^ xi(si);s) ui(si): After the buyer selects the winning seller, the buyer and the
winning seller may agree to renegotiate the contract if it is mutually benecial
given a signal vector s: If there is no contract that is mutually benecial to the
buyer and the winning seller given the signal vector, then the equilibrium is said
to be jointly ex-post renegotiation-proof.
It is clear that Ri(x
i(s);s)  Ri(^ xi(si);s) for all s = [si;s i] because x
i(s)
is jointly ex-post ecient and ^ xi(si) is only jointly interim ecient. We assume
that there exists Zi  [0;1] and Z i  [0;1]N 1, each with positive measure such
that (i) for all si 2 Zi and all s i 2 Z i;
Ri(x

i(si;s i);si;s i) > Ri(^ xi(si);si;s i): (9)
and (ii) for all si 2 Zi,
Pr(A(^ ui(si))jsi) > 0 (10)
If this assumption is not satised, then there is no sensible distinction between
interdependent values and private values in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Only the jointly ex-post ecient equilibrium, i.e., fm
1;:::;m
N;g
with i = 1 for all i; is jointly ex-post renegotiation-proof.
Joint ex-post renegotiation is a notion for examining whether the buyer and
the winning seller can improve upon their renegotiation after the winning seller is
determined. A seller may consider deviation from his menu even before the buyer
chooses the winning seller. Given the multiplicity of continuation equilibrium,
suppose that a separating equilibrium is based on a continuation equilibrium in
which the buyer always chooses a jointly interim ecient contract from seller 1's
menu upon accepting it but always chooses a jointly ex-post ecient contract
from other sellers' menus upon accepting one of them. Given this particular
continuation equilibrium, no sellers have incentives to deviate from their menus.
However, if seller 1 believed, for example, that the buyer would in fact always
choose a jointly ex-post ecient contract from his menu upon his deviation, he
would deviate to submit a menu more aggressively in the sense that his new menu
oers a higher payo to the buyer than his original menu does. Not only does
22such a deviation show that equilibrium menus (and subsequently equilibrium
contracts) in some equilibria are not robust to the possibility that the buyer
would choose an alternative continuation equilibrium for her contract choice, but
it also implies that the equilibrium prediction on how likely each seller would win
is not ex-ante robust because more aggressive menu oers from seller 1 make it
more likely for him to win and less likely for other sellers to win. In this sense, it
is important to examine how ex-ante robust an equilibrium is to (sellers' beliefs
on) the continuation equilibrium.
A separating monotone equilibrium fm
1;:::;m
N;g is ex-ante robust12 to
some alternative continuation equilibria if there exists a non-empty set of alter-
native continuation equilibria C  C with  = [
1;:::;
N] = 2 C such that, for














Fix a separating monotone equilibrium fm
1;:::;m
N;g: Suppose that seller i
with si considers a deviation. He does not have incentives to deviate when he
continues to hold the equilibrium belief on the continuation equilibrium, : Be-
cause there are multiple continuation equilibria, a seller's incentives for deviation
dier across his beliefs on the continuation equilibrium. Even when seller i with
signal si believes that the buyer might not follow the continuation equilibrium
; he does not have an incentive to deviate as long as he believes the buyer
would follow an alternative continuation equilibrium 0 in C that satises (11).
As long as the buyer chooses a jointly ex-post ecient contract with positive
probability in a separating monotone equilibrium, it is ex-ante robust to the set
of continuation equilibria where she chooses a jointly ex-post ecient contract
less likely (i.e., with a lower probability).13 Theorem 3 shows that if a separating
monotone equilibrium is based on the continuation equilibrium in which the buyer
always chooses a jointly ex-post ecient contract from the winning seller's menu,
it is ex-ante robust to every continuation equilibrium that the buyer chooses to
follow for her contract choice.
Theorem 3 A separating monotone equilibrium fm
1;:::;m
N;g with i = 1
for all i is ex-ante robust to every continuation equilibrium.
Proposition 1 and theorem 3 show that the jointly ex-post ecient equilibrium
is both jointly ex-post renegotiation-proof and ex-ante robust to all continuation
12The notion of robustness follows the strong robustness adopted for competing mechanism
games (Han 2007)
13If the buyer chooses a jointly ex-post ecient contract less likely, then a seller receives
a lower interim payo conditional on any payo level that he is willing to give to the buyer.
Therefore, an equilibrium is ex-ante robust to alternative continuation equilibria in which the
buyer chooses a jointly ex-post ecient contract less likely.
23equilibria. Hence the equilibrium contract that the buyer chooses in the jointly
ex-post ecient equilibrium is both ex-ante and ex-post stable and subsequently
the jointly ex-post ecient equilibrium provides a stable prediction on how likely
each seller would win procurement.
The jointly ex-post ecient separating monotone equilibrium is jointly ex-
post renegotiation-proof regardless of the tie-breaking rule because it considers
whether there exists a mutually benecial alternative contract for the winning
seller and the buyer after the winning seller is determined. While it, like any
other separating monotone equilibria, is ex-ante robust to some alternative tie-
breaking rules, it may not be ex-ante robust to every alternative tie-breaking rule
under interdependent values. The tie-breaking rule does not have any bite if a
deviating seller's menu has no possibility of ties with the other bidders' menus
in terms of the buyer's maximum payo that the menus can induce. However, it
can aect a seller's incentive to deviate to a menu that could tie with the other
sellers' menus with positive probability. Suppose that the the buyer follows an
alternative tie-breaking rule in which she chooses the deviating seller's menu for
sure in \good news" events in which a lot of the other sellers' menus may tie with
the deviating bidder's menu with positive probability. If the payo upon always
winning a tie conditional on \good news" events is suciently high and a seller
believes that the buyer would follow such an alternative continuation equilibrium,
he may have incentives to deviate to a menu with the possibility of ties.14
5 Discussion
Technically it is very challenging to analyze equilibrium in the rst-price menu
auction with asymmetric sellers, interdependent values, and aliated signals be-
cause it is dicult to establish the existence of a (monotone) equilibrium given
the complexity of each seller's strategy space (i.e., the set of all possible menus of
contracts). By extending Reny and Zamir's IRT-SCC and introducing TLS-SMC,
this paper demonstrates that both the weakly single crossing condition and the
weakly quasisupermodular condition in Reny (2011) are ensured at individually
rational tieless bids. This leads us not only to establish the existence of separat-
ing monotone equilibria but also enables us to study the nature of equilibrium
allocations in the rst-price menu auction under interdependent values in very
general environments.
This paper considers the case with asymmetric sellers, interdependent val-
14The existence of a monotone equilibrium under an alternative tie-breaking rule is yet to be
established. The jointly ex-post ecient separating monotone equilibrium is robust to both all
continuation equilibria and all tie-breaking rules only if every bidder's feasible menus have no
possibility of ties with the other bidders' equilibrium menus. However, it is not known when
this condition is satised.
24ues and aliated signals. For this case, one can think of the generalized VCG
mechanism (Dasgupta and Maskin 2010) or some variation of scoring auctions as
the buyer's procurement mechanism, assuming that the buyer can commit to a
decision rule or more generally mechanism. For example, one might consider the
following variation of scoring auctions. The buyer announces the scoring rule,
which is the same as the entire set of indierence curves based on her prefer-
ences. Each seller submits a score instead of a contract. The seller who submits
the highest score wins the procurement. As part of the auction rule, the buyer
can then choose any contract that generates the score that the winning seller
submits. Finally, the winning seller executes the contract chosen by the buyer.
In this case, the buyer bears all the burden of ex-ante specifying scores for all
possible contracts. Further, the ex-post ecient equilibrium may not be guar-
anteed because a seller with two dierent signals may want to submit the same
score and then the buyer cannot distinguish the two dierent signals. In contrary,
menus are suciently general to dierentiate a seller's signals even when a seller
wants to give the same level of payo to the buyer under two dierent signals.
Suppose that seller i wants to give the payo level of ~ u to the buyer under both
si and s0
i: Seller i can construct two dierent menus easily. First of all, optimal
contracts for the buyer in two menus should generate the payo level of ~ u to the
buyer. If two menus have the dierent sets of optimal contracts for the buyer,
then those two menus are dierent. If the set of optimal contracts under the two
menus are the same, then seller i can make two menus dierent by including dif-
ferent contracts, in those menus, that generate a lower payo level for the buyer
(See footnote 9).
Our approach is dierent from the mechanism design approach with the
buyer's commitment to a decision rule or mechanism. We consider the situation
in which the buyer cannot commit to a decision rule or mechanism for various
reasons such as the complexity in designing a mechanism and implementing the
decision rule in the mechanism or veriability of messages . This paper examines
the properties of equilibrium outcomes that can arise when sellers compete in
menus without the buyer's commitment. In this sense, this paper is rather close
to the growing literature on the decentralized market design via competition in
menus (e.g. Bernheim and Whinston 1986, Dixit, Grossman and Helpman 1997),
where bidders, conventionally called agents in the mechanism design literature,
jump into competition by oering menus to the decision maker who then simply
chooses what she wants from menu without committing to a decision rule.
Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997)
considered the competition in menus (e.g., bidding functions) when externalities
are associated with action or consumption (e.g., public policy or public good)
under complete information. In this case, sellers include latent contracts that are
not chosen in equilibrium in their menus in order to prevent the other sellers'
deviation. Specically, if some seller tries to enjoy free ride by lowering prices for
25a range of possible actions, the buyer optimally chooses those latent contracts
from other sellers that she would have not chosen in equilibrium and such latent
contracts punish the deviating seller.
This paper shows that the nature of the competition in menus and equilibrium
allocations are very dierent when externalities are rather associated with sellers'
private information, i.e., interdependent values. A seller's incentives to oer a
menu is not to provide latent contracts for the buyer, but to provide every possible
jointly ex-post ecient contract conditional on every possible vector of the other
sellers' signals given his own signal and the payo level that he is willing to give
to the buyer. In this way, a seller can allow the buyer to choose a jointly ex-post
ecient contract when sellers make signal-contingent menu oers.
It is shown that the separating monotone equilibrium is bounded above by the
joint ex-post eciency and below by the joint interim eciency. In the jointly ex-
post ecient equilibrium, sellers believe that the buyer will always choose a jointly
ex-post ecient contract if it is available as an optimal contract in the menu, and
they submit menus accordingly. Because the jointly ex-post ecient equilibrium
is both jointly ex-post renegotiation-proof and ex-ante robust to any continuation
equilibrium, it is very appealing and we may expect it to be the most plausible
equilibrium. With a lack of the buyer's commitment, it should be important in
practice for the buyer, as an information collector, to establish her reputation in a
way that leads sellers to believe she would eciently use the acquired information
to choose a jointly ex-post ecient contract when negotiating with the winning
seller.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. Following Reny and Zamir (2004), call a product of N real intervals in
Rk with k  1 - each of which can be closed, open or half-open - a cell. For any cells A and
A0 in Rk, A0  A if the lower (upper) endpoint of each interval in the product dening A is no
greater than the lower (upper) endpoint of the corresponding interval in the product dening
A0.
TLS-SMC: Consider any (ui;xi) and (u0
i;x0
i) such that Pr[u < maxj6=i uj(sj) = ui or u0
i] = 0
given any non-decreasing payo bidding functions u i. In this way, we can ensure that if seller
i's payo bid is ui or u0
i, then the probability that seller i's payo bid is the highest non-
negative payo bid is equal to the probability that seller i's payo bid is the unique highest
non-negative payo bid. Because f > 0 and the event that seller i's payo bid is uniquely
the highest depends only on the other sellers' signals, this event has positive probability if
and only if it has positive probability on every si 2 [0;1]: Hence we can respectively dene
the event that u0
i is a winning payo bid and the event that ui is a winning payo bid as
A0 =

s i 2 [0;1]N : maxj6=i uj(sj) < u0
i
	
and A = fs i 2 [0;1]N : maxj6=i uj(sj) < uig:
Without loss of generality, let u0
i  ui and hence ui _ u0
i = u0
i and ui ^ u0
i = ui: Because ui or
u0










Vi(ui;xi;u ijsi)   Vi(ui ^ u0
i;xi ^ x0
i;u ijsi) = Pr(Ajsi)E[R
i (xi;S)   R
i (xi ^ x0
i;S)jA;si]:




i;u ijsi) is the dierence in seller i's interim
payos associated with two action bids xi_x0
i and x0




i;u ijsi) is the dierence in seller i's interim payos associated with two action
bids xi and xi ^ x0
i given his payo bid ui: Because Pr(A0jsi)  Pr(Ajsi), TLS-SMC holds if
E[R




i (xi;S)   R
i (xi ^ x0
i;S)jA;si]: (12)
We rst compare E[R









i  ui and the other sellers employ non-decreasing strategies, both A0 and A are
products of cells with zero lower endpoints, but the upper endpoint of the cell for each seller
j's signal in A0 is no less than the upper endpoint of the corresponding cell in A: Furthermore,
R
i (xi _ x0
i;s)   R
i (x0
i;s) is non-decreasing in s i: Therefore, we can directly invoke Theorem
5 in Milgrom and Weber (1982) so that
E[R













i (xi;S)   R
i (xi ^ x0
i;S)jA; si]: Because
R
i is supermodular at each s; it is clear that
E[R




i (xi;S)   R
i (xi ^ x0
i;S)jA;si]: (14)
Combining (13) and (14) yields (12) and hence TLS-SMC holds.
IRT-SCC: This proof closely follows the proof of IRT-SCC in Reny and Zamir (2004). To
show IRT-SCC, x (ui;xi) and (ui;xi) with ui  ui and xi  xi and, for all j 6= i; x non-
decreasing payo bidding functions so that Pr[u < maxj6=i uj(Sj) = ui or ui] = 0: As in proof
of TLS-SMC, this makes the event that ui is a winning payo bid as
A =










i (xi;S)   uijA;si

is non-decreasing in si whenever A has positive proba-
bility.
Suppose that (ui;xi) wins with positive probability. This means that (ui;xi) also wins with
positive probability because ui  ui; hence A has positive probability. As in Reny and Zamir
(2004), partition A as follows. For every subset J of f1;:::;Ngnfig; dene
A(J) = A \ fs i 2 [0;1]N 1 : 8j 6= i;uj(sj)  ui i j 2 Jg:
Ignoring ties, A(J) is the event that (ui;xi) loses against precisely those sellers in J: Because
A(J) is contained in A, (ui;xi) wins against every j 6= i in each event A(J): Also, A(;), being
the event that (ui;xi) loses against no one, is the event that (ui;xi) wins the procurement
and so has positive probability. IRT-SCC holds if the following statement holds for all pairs of
s0
i  si: When E

R






i (xi;S)   ui   (R






i (xi;S)   ui   (R










i (xi;S)   ui   (R







i (xi;S)   ui   (R
i (xi;S)   ui)IA(;)jA;si

 0: (16)
27By Theorem 5 in Milgrom and Weber (1982), E

R
i (xi;S)   uijA;si





i (xi;S)   uijA;s0
i

 0: Subsequently, if E[(R
i (xi;S)   ui)IA(;)jA;s0
i] < 0; equivalently,
E[R
i (xi;S)   uijA(;);s0
i] < 0; then (15) trivially holds because the second dierence is non-
negative. Therefore, it is sucient to establish (15) and (16) when E

(R





i (xi;S)   uijA(;);s0







i (xi;S)   ui   (R







i (xi;S)   ui   (R
i (xi;S)   ui)IA(;)jA;si

: (17)
Let i(s) = R
i (xi;s)   ui   (R
i (xi;s)   ui)IA(;): Note that i(s) is non-decreasing in si.
According to Lemma A.1 in Reny and Zamir (2004), it is therefore enough to show that i(s0
i;)
is cell-wise non-decreasing with respect to f(s ijA;s0
i), where f(s ijA;s0
i) is the density function
for s i conditional on (A;s0
i). By considering the above nite partition, fA(J)g; of A into cells,
we can restrict attention to those subsets of J such that A(J) is non-empty. For any non-empty




i (xi;S)   ui   (R




i (xi;S)   uijA(J);s0
i]: (18)
If A(J0)  A(J); the inequality relation
E[R
i (xi;S)   uijA(J0);s0
i]  E[R
i (xi;S)   uijA(J);s0
i] (19)
follows from Theorem 5 in Milgrom and Weber (1982). (18) and (19) imply that for any pair




i (xi;S)   ui   (R







i (xi;S)   ui   (R




Furthermore, for every A(J)  A(;); we have
E[R
i (xi;S)   uijA(J);s0
i]  E[R
i (xi;S)   uijA(;);s0
i]
 E[R
i (xi;S)   ui   (R
i (xi;S)   ui)jA(;);s0
i]; (21)
where the rst inequality follows from Theorem 5 in Milgrom and Weber (1982) and the second
follows because E[R
i (xi;S)   uijA(;);s0





i (xi;S)   ui   (R





i (xi;S)   ui   (R
i (xi;S)   ui)jA(;);s0
i]. (22)
Finally, (20) and (22) show that i(si;) is cell-wise non-decreasing with respect to f(s ijA;s0
i):
Proof of Lemma 2. First, we show that the set of each seller i's best replies is monotone.
Consider Bi(si) and Bi(s0
i) for seller i, one under si and the other with s0
i such that s0
i  si  "
given the other sellers' monotone strategies. For Reny's monotonicity of the set of seller i's
28best replies, it is sucient to show that whenever a best reply (ui;xi) in Bi(si) is not (u;x),
then (ui _ u0
i;xi _ x0
i) 2 Bi(s0






i) 6= (u;x): Because (ui;xi) 6= (u;x) is in Bi(si) and (u;x) is
always feasible, we have
Vi(ui;xi;u ijsi)  Vi(ui ^ u0
i;xi ^ x0
i;u ijsi): (23)
Note that both (ui;xi) and (u0
i;x0
i) are not (u;x): Because no two payo bid sets have any seri-
ous bid in common, Pr[u < maxj6=i uj(sj) = ui or u0
i] = 0: Furthermore, (ui;xi) is individually
rational because it is in Bi(si): Invoking (8) in IRT-SCC, (23) yields
Vi(ui;xi;u ijs0












so that (ui _ u0
i;xi _ x0




i) = (u;x): The interim payo for seller i with signal si; associated
with (ui;xi) 2 Bi(si) such that (ui;xi) 6= (u;x); is
Vi(ui;xi;u ijsi) = Pr(A(ui)jsi)E[R
i (xi;S)   uijA(ui);si]  0; (26)
where the inequality holds because (ui;xi) 2 Bi(si), the losing bid (u;x) is always feasible for
seller i; and ui 6= u does not tie with the other sellers' payo bids. Because every other seller j
submits (u;x) when his signal is in [0;") and the joint density of signals is strictly positive on
[0;1]N, (ui;xi) 6= (u;x) wins the procurement with positive probability, i.e., Pr(A(ui)jsi) > 0;
for any si. It follows that (26) implies
E[R
i (xi;S)   uijA(ui);si]  0: (27)
Because R
i (xi;s)   ui is non-decreasing in si, Theorem 5 in Milgrom and Weber leads (27) to
E[R
i (xi;S)   uijA(ui);s0
i]  0: (28)




i (x;S)   ujA(ui);s0
i]  0: (29)
Because (u0
i;x0
i) = (u;x) 2 Bi(s0








i) = 0 (30)
so that (ui _ u0
i;xi _ x0
i) = (ui;xi) 2 Bi(s0
i)




i) for any (u0
i;x0
i) 2 Bi(s0
i) and any s0
i and si such that s0
i  si  ": Therefore,
Reny's monotonicity of the set of seller i's best replies goes through.
Examine the join-closedness of Bi(si). Reny's monotonicity of the set of seller i's best replies
states that if s0
i  si; (ui;xi) 2 Bi(si) and (u0
i;x0
i) 2 Bi(s0





i = si yields that (ui;xi) 2 Bi(si) and (u0
i;x0
i) 2 Bi(si) imply (ui_u0
i;xi_x0
i) 2 Bi(si).
Therefore, Bi(si) is join-closed.
29Examine the non-emptiness of Bi(si): A characteristics bid xi that seller i submits along
with a payo bid ui does not aect the winning event, and it is chosen with probability i
conditional on seller i winning the procurement. Furthermore, the buyer takes the monetary
payment ti = u(xi)   ui given, in this case, seller i's bid (ui;xi): If seller i with signal si
submits a payo bid ui for any ui 2 Un
i ; it is optimal for him to submit the jointly interim
ecient characteristics xe
i(A(ui);si;u i) in Xe
i (A(ui);si;u i) , as dened in (2). Note that
Xe
i (A(ui);si;u i) is non-empty. Because Un
i is a nite set and Vi(ui;xe
i(A(ui);si;u i);u ijsi)
is bounded, there exists a payo bid in Un
i that maximizes Vi(ui;xe
i(A(ui);si;u i);u ijsi):
Therefore, Bi(si) is non-empty.
Finally, Un
i is a nite set and a lattice. This property and assumption 1 lead Un
i  X
to satisfy G.3 and G.4 in Reny (2011). Assumption 3.(i) and 2.(i)-(ii) satisfy G.1, G.2, and
G.5; therefore, Reny's conditions (G.1-G.5) on players' actions, payo functions and types are
all satised. The existence of a monotone equilibrium is established by Theorem 4.1 in Reny
(2011).
Proof of Theorem 1. The existence of a monotone equilibrium in the modied auction with
nite sets of payo bids is established in Lemma 2. The proof of Theorem 1 extends part 2
of the proof of Theorem 2.1 in Reny and Zamir (2004) to show that the limit of the modied
auctions with nite sets of payo bids has a monotone equilibrium without restrictions on the
sets of payo bids. For n = 1;2;:::; let Gn denote the modied auction in which seller i's nite
set of payo bids is denoted by Un








i is dense in Ui. Let (un
i ;xn
i ) be seller i's equilibrium
strategy in the modied auction Gn.
Consider the limit strategies. Because R(;s) is bounded above at each s 2 [0;1]N with
Assumption 2.(iii), there exists ~ u > 0 such that R(x;s)   ~ u < 0 for all (x;s) 2 X[0;1]N:
Therefore, un
i () is bounded above by ~ u and below by u, and it is also non-decreasing in si.
By Helley's Selection Theorem, we then have that un
i (si) ! ^ ui(si) for a.e. si 2 [0;1], where
^ ui() is a non-decreasing function.
Because xn
i () is non-decreasing in si, and the conditions G.1-G.3 in Reny (2011), a general-
ized Helley's selection Theorem (Lemma A.10 in Reny 2011) implies that xn
i (si) ! ^ xi(si) for a.e.
si 2 [0;1]; where ^ xi() is a non-decreasing function. We shall prove that f(^ u1;^ x1);:::;(^ uN;^ xN)g
is a monotone equilibrium in the modied auction. Ties should be carefully handled in two
fronts.
In point 1, we show that, given the limit bidding functions ^ u i of the other sellers, seller
i's interim payo associated with any bid (ui;xi) can be approximated arbitrarily well or he
can improve upon his payo by slightly increasing his payo bid, given the same action bid xi,
that does not tie the other sellers' payo bids with probability one. This is illustrated in (31).
In point 2, we are concerned that the possibility of ties may lead the limiting payos to
dier from the payos at the limit strategies. It is shown that the probability that, under ^ u,
two or more sellers simultaneously submit the highest payo bid above u is zero so that the
limiting payo for seller i with si is always obtained by employing the limit bids (^ ui(si);^ xi(si))
given the other sellers' limit bidding functions, ^ u i.
Point 1: Given the other sellers' non-decreasing payo bidding functions ^ u i; let A(ui) =
fs i 2 [0;1]N 1 : maxj6=i ^ uj(sj)  uig: Suppose that seller i with si submits a bid (ui;xi) such
that Vi(ui;xi;^ u ijsi)  0. Let E[jsi;Hi] = 0 if Pr(Hijsi) = 0: Then, the following relations
30hold:
0  Vi(ui;xi;^ u ijsi) (31)
= Pr(A(ui)jsi)E[(R
i (xi;S)   ui)i(ui;^ u i(S i))jA(ui);si]
 Pr(A(ui)jsi)E[R
i (xi;S)   uijA(ui);si]E[i(ui;^ u i(S i))jA(ui);si]
 Pr(A(ui)jsi)E[R






where the inequality on the third line follows from Theorem 23 in Milgrom and Weber (1982)
because both R
i (xi;s) ui and 1 i(ui;^ u i(s i)) are non-decreasing in s i given the uniform
tie-breaking rule. The inequality on the fourth line holds because
Pr(A(ui)jsi) > 0 =) 0 < E[i(ui;^ u i(S i))jA(ui);si]  1
given the uniform tie-breaking rule: The equality on the fth line holds because seller i can
approximate his payo arbitrarily well by submitting a slightly higher payo bid u0
i; with the
same characteristics bid xi; that is never one of the at most countably many mass points of
maxj6=i ^ uj(Sj).
Point 2: Recall that R(x;s)   u = 0 for all i and all s. When ui = u; dene u0
i # ui
to mean u0
i = u. Note that u 2 Un
i : Therefore, for every i and a.e. si such that ^ ui(si) > u
and Pr[maxj6=i ^ uj(Sj)  ^ ui(Si)jsi] > 0; the following holds when n is large enough:
0  E[R
i (xn












j (Sj)  ^ ui(si) + ]
! E[R
i (^ xi(si);S)   ^ ui(si)jsi;max
j6=i
^ uj(Sj)  ^ ui(si)]:
^ ui(si) > u implies that un
i (si) is a serious payo bid when n is large enough. This implies
that (i) it wins with positive probability given the strategy restriction and (ii) the right hand
side in the rst line is seller i's payo because ties in Gn cannot occur at serious payo bids.
Therefore, the rst line of (32) holds. The second line follows for any  > 0 by Theorem 5 in
Milgrom and Weber (1982). For the third line, note that R
i (;s) is continuous by Assumption
1.(i)-(ii). The third line follow by taking the limit rst as n ! 1 and then as  # 0 along
a sequence such that ^ ui(si) +  is never one of the at most countably many mass points of
maxj6=i ^ uj(Sj): This ensures that the rst limit in n exists for each such .
Now we consider the limit payos. Because i(ui;u i) is non-decreasing in ui and non-
increasing in u i; i(un(s)) is a sequence of functions each of which is monotone in each
of its arguments, s1;:::;sN; and is non-decreasing in si and non-increasing in s i: Hence,
by Helley's Theorem, there exists i : [0;1]N ! [0;1] that is non-decreasing in si and non-
increasing in s i such that i(un(s)) ! i(s) for a.e. s 2 [0;1]N: Consequently, we have P
i i(s) = 1 for a.e. s 2 [0;1]N: One can think of i(s) as a surrogate tie-breaking rule
that is a function of the vector of signals alone. Then, the equilibrium interim payo for






i (si))i(un(S))jsi] converges to
E[(R
i (^ xi(si);S)   ^ ui(si))i(S)jsi] by the dominated convergence theorem.
Because each ^ uj(Sj) has at most countably many mass points and Un
i becomes dense in













for n   n: The rst and second lines in (33) hold because we can choose  ui such that the
probability that any ^ uj(Sj) is equal to  ui is arbitrarily small. The third line holds because  ui
is feasible in Un
i for n   n and un
i is the equilibrium bidding function for seller i. Because " is











i (^ xi(si);S)   ^ ui(si))i(S)jsi]: (34)
Letting A(^ ui(si)) = fs i 2 [0;1]N 1 : maxj6=i ^ uj(sj)  ^ ui(si)g, that for a.e. si such that
^ ui(si) > u;
0  E[(R
i (^ x(si);S)   ^ ui(si))i(S)jsi] (35)
= Pr(A(^ ui(si))jsi)E[(R
i (^ xi(si);S)   ^ ui(si))i(S)jA(^ ui(si));si]
 Pr(A(^ ui(si))jsi)E[R
i (^ x(si);S)   ^ ui(si)jA(^ ui(si));si]E[i(S)jA(^ ui(si));si]
 Pr(A(^ ui(si))jsi)E[R
i (^ x(si);S)   ^ ui(si)jA(^ ui(si));si]
= lim
"#0




The inequality on the rst line in (35) follows from (34). The equality on the second line is
immediately apparent because i(s) = 0 for a.e. s i = 2 A(^ ui(si)). The inequality on the third
line follows from Theorem 23 in Milgrom and Weber (1982). The inequality on the fourth line
holds because i(s) 2 [0;1], and by (32), Pr(A(^ ui(si))jsi) > 0 implies that E[R
i (^ x(si);S)  
^ ui(si)jA(^ ui(si));si]  0: The equality on the fth line holds, as on the fth line in (31), because
seller i can approximate his payo arbitrarily well by submitting a slightly higher payo bid
^ ui(si) that, with probability one, does not tie the others' payo bids, along with ^ x(si). By the
last inequality in (35) and the inequality in (34), the second, third, and fourth inequalities in
(35) must be equalities.
Now we prove that E[i(S)jA(^ ui(si));si] = 1 for a.e. si that satises Pr(A(^ ui(si))jsi) > 0:
Because the third inequality in (35) holds with equality, we have, for a.e. si with Pr(A(^ ui(si))jsi) >
0; we have
0  E[R
i (^ xi(si);S)   ^ ui(si)jA(^ ui(si));si]E[i(S)jA(^ ui(si));si]
= E[R
i (^ xi(si);S)   ^ ui(si)jA(^ ui(si));si]: (36)
For a.e. si and s0
i such that si > s0
i, Pr(A(^ ui(si))jsi) > 0 and Pr(A(^ ui(s0
i))js0









i);S)   ^ ui(s0
i)jA(^ ui(s0
i));si]. (37)
32The rst inequality in (37) holds by (36). Because R
i (xi;s)   ui is strictly increasing in si,
Theorem 5 in Milgrom and Weber (1982) implies the second inequality in (37).




i) + ";^ xi(s0





Vi(^ ui(si) + ";^ xi(si);^ u ijsi): (38)
Note that Pr(A(^ ui(s0
i))js0
i) > 0 implies Pr(A(^ ui(s0
i)jsi) > 0 by Assumption 3.(i). Therefore,
(37) leads to
0 < Pr(A(^ ui(s0
i)jsi)E[R
i (^ xi(s0
i);S)   ^ ui(s0
i)jA(^ ui(s0
i));si]: (39)
Because seller i can approximate his conditional interim payo arbitrarily well to the right
hand side of (39) by submitting a slightly higher payo bid that, with probability one, does
not tie the others' payo bids, along with submitting ^ xi(s0
i), (39) implies that the inequality
on the rst line of (38) holds. The inequality on the second line follows the denition of
supui;xi Vi(ui;xi;^ u ijsi) and the equality on the third line holds because the fourth inequality
in (35) is in fact an equality. (38) shows that 0 < lim"#0 Vi(^ ui(si) + ";^ xi(si);^ u ijsi). Because
Pr(A(^ ui(si)jsi) > 0; it implies that
E[R
i (^ xi(si);S)   ^ ui(si)jA(^ ui(si));si] > 0:
Therefore, the inequality in (36) must be strict for a.e. si such that Pr(A(^ ui(si)) jsi) > 0 so
that E[i(S)jA(^ ui(si));si] = 1 for a.e. si such that Pr(A(^ ui(si))jsi) > 0:
Let TI = fs : ^ ui(si) = maxj ^ uj(sj) > u;8i 2 Ig for any non-empty subset I 
f1;:::;Ng. Consequently, if Pr(TI) > 0; then every i 2 I; i(s) = 1 for a.e. s 2 TI: However, P
i2I i(s)  1 for a.e. s 2 [0;1]N: This implies that #(I) = 1: Therefore, the probability
that under payo bidding functions ^ u, two or more sellers simultaneously submit the highest
bid above u is zero. Then, for every i and a.e. si; Vi(^ ui(si);^ xi(si);^ u ijsi) is continuous at




 ijsi) = Vi(^ ui(si);^ xi(si);;^ u ijsi) for a.e. si and (34) implies
that f(^ u1;^ x1);:::;(^ uN;^ xN)g is a monotone equilibrium of the modied auction.
Proof of Theorem 2. Fix a monotone equilibrium f(^ u1;^ x1);:::;(^ uN;^ xN)g in the modied
auction for any given  = [1;:::;N] 2 [0;1]N: For any menu mi in the the rst-price menu
auction, let ~ ui(mi) be the maximum payo level that the buyer can achieve by choosing mi: Let
each seller i choose a menu m
i (si) that satises (i) ~ ui(m
i (si)) = ^ ui(si) for all si 2 [0;1]; (ii)
(x
i(s);u(x
i(s)) ^ ui(si)) 2 D(mi) for all s 2 [0;1]N; (iii) (^ xi(si);u(^ xi(si)) ^ ui(si)) 2 D(mi) for
all si 2 [0;1]; and (iv) m
i (si) 6= m
i (s0
i) if si 6= s0
i: Once the buyer accepts seller i's menu mi;
given the other sellers' menu strategies m
 i; she chooses a contract from mi in the following
manner:
1. If mi = m





(^ xi(si);u(^ xi(si))   ^ ui(si)) 2 D(mi) with prob 1   i
(x
i(s);u(x




 i(s i)) = (xi;u(xi)   ~ ui(mi)) with prob. one, where x is some
arbitrary characteristics such that (xi;u(xi)   ~ ui(mi)) 2 D(mi).
33Because D(mi) is the set of optimal contracts for the buyer once she accepts mi;  =
[
1;:::;
N] characterized by 1 and 2 is a continuation equilibrium. Suppose that seller i
chooses a strategy m
i : When his signal is si and he oers the menu m






(1   i)Pr(A(^ ui(si))jsi)E[(Ri(^ xi(Si);S)   ^ ui(Si))i(^ u(S))jA(^ ui(si));si]+
i Pr(A(^ ui(si))jsi)E[(Ri(x
i(S);S)   ^ ui(Si))i(^ u(S))jA(^ ui(si));si] =
Vi(^ ui(si);^ xi(si);^ u ijsi): (40)
There are two types of deviations in the the rst-price menu auction. First of all, consider
that seller i deviates to a menu m
i (s0
i) for some s0
i (s0
i 6= si). When seller i with si deviates to
the menu m
i (s0
i), the buyer believes that his signal is s0
i: Once she accepts the menu m
i (s0
i);
she will take the characteristics ^ xi(s0
i) with probability 1 i and the characteristics x
i(s0
i;s i)
with probability i when the other sellers' menus are m










i ) = (1   i)Pr(A(^ ui(s0
i))jsi)
E[(Ri(^ xi(s0







































i);si;^ u i);^ u ijsi): (42)
We show why (42) holds. Note that the equality in (42) follows the denition of the
interim payo for seller i with si; i.e., Vi(^ ui(s0
i);xe
i(^ ui(s0
i);si;^ u i);^ u ijsi); in the modied
auction when he deviates to submit the bid (^ ui(s0
i);xe
i(^ ui(s0
i);si;^ u i)): Consider the inequal-
ity in (42). The winning event associated with the bid (^ ui(s0
i);xe
i(^ ui(s0
i);si;^ u i)) in the
modied auction and the winning event associated with m
i (s0
i) in the the rst-price menu
auction are both A(^ ui(s0
i)): When seller i of signal si deviates to m
i (s0
i) in the the rst-
price menu auction, the buyer chooses (^ xi(s0
i);u(^ xi(s0
i))   ^ ui(s0





i;s i))   ^ ui(s0
i)) at each s i with probability i as if seller i's signal was s0
i:
However, when seller i of signal si deviates to the bid (^ ui(s0
i);xe
i(^ ui(s0
i);si;^ u i)) in the modied





i);si;^ u i))   ^ ui(s0
i))
with probability 1   i and a correct jointly ex-post ecient contract
(x
i(si;s i);u(x
i(si;s i)   ^ ui(s0
i))
34at each s i with probability i, knowing that seller i's true signal is si. Therefore, the inequality
in (42) holds.





i);si;^ u i);^ u ijsi)  Vi(^ ui(si);^ xi(si);^ u ijsi) (43)




i )  Vi(^ ui(s0
i);xe
i(^ ui(s0













Therefore, it is not protable for seller i with a.e. si to deviate to m
i (s0
i) with s0
i 6= si in the
the rst-price menu auction.




i 2 [0;1]: In continuation equilibrium ; the buyer takes characteristics xi along with
the monetary payment u(xi)   ~ ui(mi) with probability one upon accepting mi: Suppose that
seller i deviates to submit (~ ui(mi);xi) in the modied auction. The winning event for seller i
in the modied auction is the same as the one in the the rst-price menu auction. While the
buyer always chooses (xi;u(xi)   ~ ui(mi)) in the the rst-price menu auction upon accepting
mi, she chooses (x
i(s);u(x
i(s))   ~ ui(mi)) with probability i and (xi;u(xi)   ~ ui(mi)) with
probability 1   i in the modied auction. Because x
i(s) is jointly ex-post ecient, seller i's
interim payo upon deviation to a menu mi in the the rst-price menu auction is no greater




i )  Vi(~ ui(mi);xi;^ u ijsi): (44)
Because f(^ u1;^ x1);:::;(^ uN;^ xN)g is a monotone equilibrium in the modied auction, we have
Vi(~ ui(mi);xi;^ u ijsi)  Vi(^ ui(si);^ xi(si);^ u ijsi): (45)
for a.e. si: From (40), (44) and (45), we can conclude, for a.e., si;
Vi(mi;m
 ijsi;









Because there is no protable deviation for each seller i in the the rst-price menu auction,
the existence of the separating monotone equilibrium fm
1;:::;m
N; g follows immediately
from the existence of the corresponding monotone equilibrium f(^ u1;^ x1);:::;(^ uN;^ xN)g in the
modied auction.
Proof of Proposition 1. If the buyer chooses a jointly interim ecient contract with positive
probability 1   i from the winning seller i, i < 1; then the ex-post surplus Ri(^ xi(si);si;s i)
between the winning seller i and the buyer is strictly less than the jointly ex-post ecient surplus
for all si 2 Zi and all s i 2 Z i: It implies that with positive probability, the winning seller i and
the buyer can renegotiate in such a way that both of them are strictly better o by agreeing on a
jointly ex-post ecient contract. When a separating monotone equilibrium fm
1;:::;m
N;g
is jointly ex-post ecient (i.e., i = 1 for all i), one cannot nd an alternative contract on
which the buyer and the winning seller can mutually agree at any realized signal vector given
the payos that they would receive from the buyer's original choice of a contract from the menu.
35It implies that only the jointly ex-post ecient equilibrium, i.e., fm
1;:::;m
N;g with i = 1
for all i; is jointly ex-post renegotiation-proof.
Proof of Theorem 3. Consider the separating monotone equilibrium fm1
1;:::;m1
N;1g
with 1 = [1;1;:::;1]: Note that it corresponds to a monotone equilibrium f(^ u1;^ x1);:::;(^ uN;
^ xN)g in the modied auction with i = 1 for all i. Suppose that seller i with signal si deviates
to an arbitrary menu mi that can induce the maximum payo ui to the buyer in the rst-price
menu auction. When seller i deviates to the payo bid ui along with an action bid xi in the
modied auction, his interim payo upon such a deviation satises
Vi(^ ui(si);^ xi(si);^ u ijsi)  Vi(ui;xi;^ u ijsi) (46)
for a.e. si because (^ ui();^ xi()) is bidder i's equilibrium strategy. Note that the buyer always
chooses a jointly ex-post ecient contract in the modied auction and that the winning event
for seller i is the same whether he deviates to mi in the rst-price menu auction or to the
corresponding payo bid ui along with an action bid xi in the modied auction. Therefore, we
have that, for any continuation equilibrium 0 = [0
1;:::;0
N] and all mi,







i ) = Vi(^ ui(si);^ xi(si);^ u ijsi);




i )  Vi(mi;m1
 ijsi;0
i)
given any continuation equilibrium 0 = [0
1;:::;0
N] and all mi: Therefore, the separating
monotone equilibrium fm
1;:::;m
N;g is ex-ante robust to every continuation equilibrium if
 = [1;:::;1].
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